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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Works by John Dewey:
Southern Illinois University Press publishes a collection of John Dewey’s
complete works in 37 volumes. They are separated into three sections: The
Early Works, The Middle Works, and The Later Works. My citations will
follow the standard format of referencing the section, volume and page number
in this collection, save for when the citation also can be found in a separately
published volume. Then, I will include the following abbreviations.
HWT
DE
RP
HNC
EN
PP
QC
ION
CF
AE
LSA
LTI
EE
FC

How We Think (1910)(Rev. 1933)
Democracy and Education (1916)
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920)
Human Nature and Conduct (1922)
Experience and Nature (1925)
The Public and its Problems (1927)
The Quest for Certainty (1929)
Individualism: Old and New (1930)
A Common Faith (1934)
Art as Experience (1934)
Liberalism and Social Action (1935)
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938)
Experience and Education (1939)
Freedom and Culture (1939)
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(MW 6)
(MW 9)
(MW 12)
(MW 14)
(LW 1)
(LW 2)
(LW 4)
(LW 5)
(LW 9)
(LW 10)
(LW 11)
(LW 12)
(LW 13)
(LW 13)

EXPERIENCE AND INQUIRY IN JOHN DEWEY’S CONTEXTUALISM
Christopher C. Kirby
ABSTRACT
This paper will focus on two elements, viz. experience and inquiry, which are
central to John Dewey’s philosophy and their relation to the movement known as
“pragmatism.” Although each of these concepts has received extensive treatment by
other schools of thought, the pragmatists, and particularly Dewey, did much to
redefine each in hopes of alleviating the tension between conflicting philosophical
viewpoints. An explication of Dewey’s view on experience is the first step in
understanding his application of the pragmatic method towards reconstructing
philosophical thinking. Therefore, this paper will explore the meaning that Dewey
gave to each and how that meaning is helpful to the overall pragmatist project of
reuniting philosophical speculation with practical consequences.
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PREFACE – THE METHOD OF PRAGMATISM
Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of
philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the
problems of men. [MW 10:46]

A Method, Not a Theory
Today’s world is one of great uncertainty. We are faced with problems both old
and new, and on a larger scale than our species has ever before witnessed. It could be
said that the tools of philosophy, i.e. its theories and abstractions, were first forged by
humanity’s quest for safety against the uncertainty of life. But, if philosophy hopes to
successfully address the problems facing it now, it may be forced to return from its
theoretical abstractions to concrete life.
The American philosophical movement that thrived between the Civil War and
World War II, commonly known as “pragmatism,” was founded on this notion.
Unfortunately, pragmatism has been mischaracterized by much of the philosophic
community. And, although it is fairly well recognized that one of the main precepts
of pragmatism is the call for philosophic endeavors to concern themselves with
concrete problems rather than abstract speculations, there is nevertheless a public
misunderstanding over the meaning of pragmatism.
While past philosophers have made similar claims about practicality,
pragmatism is set apart by the gravity it placed on the notion. This has led to an
unfortunate caricature of pragmatism as the philosophical endorsement of
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opportunism, found in the worst parts of American industry and commerce. Yet, this
is a point that nearly every thinker in the pragmatic tradition has explicitly denied.1
Even those who have some familiarity with pragmatism have tended to
misjudge its most central tenets.2 One of the most notable misunderstandings is
perhaps the equation of pragmatism with what has been called the “pragmatic theory
of truth.” The upshot of this confusion is the identification of the platitude “Truth is
what works” as pragmatism’s major (and perhaps only) contribution to philosophy.
However, such a depiction captures what many pragmatists would claim is perhaps
only a consequence of pragmatism and not one of its central tenets. For instance,
Charles Sanders Peirce, who coined the movement’s name, saw pragmatism as
primarily a criterion for determining the meaning of words. Only through the work of
his friend and colleague, William James, was a more general conception of
pragmatism as a theory about truth offered. Yet, even James – as the subtitle of his
1907 work Pragmatism reveals – preferred to see pragmatism as “A New Name for
Some Old Ways of Thinking.” As he put it elsewhere,
Philosophies, whether expressed in sonnets or systems, all must
wear this form. The thinker starts from some experience of the
practical world, and asks its meaning. He launches himself upon the
speculative sea, and makes a voyage long or short. He ascends into
the empyrean, and communes with the eternal essences. But
whatever his achievements and discoveries be while gone, the
utmost result they can issue in is some new practical maxim or
1

For example, consider James’ remark to H.G. Wells, “…the moral flabbiness born of the exclusive
worship of the bitch-goddess SUCCESS. That—with the squalid cash interpretation put on the word
success—is our national disease.” The Letters of William James, vol. 2 (1920). And, John Dewey’s
assertion “Pragmatism is… far from being that glorification of action for its own sake which is
regarded as the peculiar characteristic of American life.” (LW 2:5)
2
Bertrand Russell’s indictment of Dewey’s notion of inquiry is arguably one instance of this. (cf.
“Dewey’s New Logic,” In The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 1. ed. By Paul Schilpp and Lewis
Hahn. Lasalle, IL: Open Court, (3rd edition) 1989.
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resolve, or the denial of some old one, with which inevitably he is
sooner or later washed ashore on the terra firma of concrete life
again.3
As James so poetically expresses in this passage, the main principle of pragmatism –
finding the difference an idea makes to the real world – underlies all philosophical
inquiry.
With this in mind, pragmatism ought to be seen not as North America’s
attempt to replace old theories with new ones, but rather as an overhauling of the
method of philosophical thinking through a coalescing of abstract reason with
practical consequence. In this spirit, James, citing the Italian novelist Giovanni
Papini, claimed that pragmatism “lies in the midst of [all] our theories, like a
corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it.”4
The Development of Pragmatic Method in John Dewey’s Work
To attempt to address the above-mentioned mischaracterization as it applies to
the entire tradition of pragmatism would present too large of a task to accomplish in
this investigation. Therefore, this paper will focus mainly only on the philosophy of
one of the “pragmatic” thinkers. And, although Peirce and James are pivotal figures
in the development of pragmatism, their views differed to such an extent that to focus
on either, in my opinion, would present only one pole of pragmatic thought.
Fortunately, there was a figure that coalesced the differences of Peirce and James
while staying true to their shared desire to give a method for dealing with the potency

3

James, William. “Reflex Action and Theism,” from The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular
Philosophy. (Dover: 1956) pgs. 142-143
4
James, William. “What Pragmatism Means.” from Pragmatism and Other Writings. (New York:
Penguin Classics) 2000. pg. 26 [my brackets]
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of ideas. This figure was John Dewey, Peirce’s one-time student at Johns Hopkins
and an admirer and avid reader of James’ work.
Born in 1859 to a Burlington grocer, Dewey has been considered by many to
be the most prolific philosopher the United States has ever produced, though he may
have rejected that title in favor of being remembered as an “intellectual at large.” For,
on his view, it was the responsibility of the philosopher to be just as concerned with
public issues as with esoteric ones. His work – which included an array of
publications related to politics, pedagogy, logic, and even art – could be seen as the
embodiment of this view. And, although Dewey preferred to call his philosophy
“instrumentalism,” because of its emphasis on the utility of ideas in explicating how
human beings relate to their surroundings, he arguably did more to promote and
sustain the ideas of pragmatism than any other thinker of his time.5
However, Dewey did not begin his career as a pragmatist. His mature position
developed slowly over the course of his very lengthy career, which lasted for more
than seventy years. His body of work is so prodigious that it has been divided into
three periods – early, middle and late – roughly corresponding with what many
consider the three major stages of his career – the idealistic, experimental and
naturalistic.6 It was in the second stage of his career that Dewey began to assert, like

5

Although James is considered by many to be the foremost pragmatist, because he died at the
relatively early age of 62, as compared to Dewey’s 93 years, and because Dewey traveled extensively,
it could be said that Dewey’s influence reached a broader audience and for a longer period of time.
There are many excellent biographical works on Dewey that illustrate the range of his influence. A
good introduction for those unfamiliar with Dewey’s work would be Paul Strathern’s Dewey in 90
Minutes. (Ivan R. Dee Press: Chicago, 2002.)
6
In his introduction to Dewey’s On Experience, Nature, and Freedom, Richard Bernstein identifies
three distinct periods in Dewey’s thought, each lasting approximately twenty years. In Dewey’s
Metaphysics. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988) Raymond Boisvert labels the first of these
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Peirce before him, that the method employed by the natural sciences (one that placed
theories on “probation” until some practical data could affirm or refute them) was the
method that needed to be applied in philosophy.7 In subsequent years, once Dewey
had been exposed to James’ “radical empiricism,” i.e. the belief that experience as a
whole is more than the sum of its parts, he would revise that assertion to include all
experience, not merely the reflective experience of philosophical inquiry.
The point of departure for this analysis will be the years just before Dewey
penned Experience and Nature and thus completed his transition toward naturalism.
It could be argued that his brand of naturalism consists in two basic criteria: that
psychological states are reducible to terms about organisms interacting with their
environment, and, that a form of inquiry patterned after science is the only way to
utilize experience in dealing with the world. Taken together, these suggest that nature
is a sort of context in which humankind finds itself embedded. It is my contention
that the overarching theme of Dewey’s philosophy is, “that the most pervasive
fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to neglect of context.”8 Although I believe
that all of Dewey’s major works after his 1910 offering, How We Think (confer with
the “Abbreviations” section above), address this theme to some extent or another,
four titles in particular – Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature
(1925), Art as Experience (1934), and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) – will

periods “Dewey’s Idealistic Years”, which refers to the pivotal role of Kantian and Hegelian
philosophy in this stage of Dewey’s development.
7
Cf. “The Rules of Philosophy,” from Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. ed. by Charles
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 1934. pgs 156-158, in which
Peirce wrote “In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached it is
considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached.”
8
LW 6:5
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serve as my main focus. For it was in those four volumes that Dewey worked out the
conceptual roots of his mature thought – referred to as contextualism.
While the notion of context was of the utmost importance to Dewey’s thought,
oddly enough, he rarely wrote on the topic explicitly. This has lent some vagueness
to this aspect of his thought and is typically treated by Dewey scholars with
obscurity, if treated at all. That is a tendency I wish to avoid in this analysis, but
since I will treat Dewey’s notion of context in extensa in the following chapters it
will suffice in this preface to define contextualism as a philosophical emphasis on the
environmental, historical and cultural frameworks of ideas. As I will contend,
Dewey’s expression of the pragmatic method, in which he employed both Peircean
and Jamesean elements, can be properly understood only when its backward-looking,
contextual and forward-looking, instrumental components are understood. In this
analysis, I will recount the core concepts that constitute Dewey’s version of the
pragmatic method, viz. experience and inquiry, and analyze how they exemplify the
union of his contextualism and instrumentalism. To sum up my goal in one sentence,
I believe that Dewey’s work demonstrates that pragmatic method is the recognition
of context.
In chapter one, “Experience: The Formation of Context” I will explore the
features of Dewey’s conception of experience that set it apart from other accounts as
well as discuss the implications this account has for Dewey’s conception of
“context.” My second chapter, “Inquiry: The Enrichment of Context,” will focus on
Dewey’s view of inquiry, which could be called the central mechanism of his entire
corpus (with his 1938 publication Logic: The Theory of Inquiry being the most
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complete articulation of the concept.) I will examine the role inquiry plays, according
to Dewey, in the formation of contexts. “Growth: The Outcome of Context and the
Pragmatic Method,” my third chapter, will address the implications and byproducts
of Dewey’s rendering of experience and inquiry by explicating Dewey’s term
“growth” as it is expressed in what he called “habit reconstruction.” There, I will also
address the anticipated tensions that might surround my reading of these conceptions
as Dewey’s means for reconstructing the method of philosophical investigation that
he called, alternately, pragmatism and instrumentalism.

7

CHAPTER ONE – EXPERIENCE: THE FORMATION OF CONTEXT
Reference to the primacy and ultimacy of the material of ordinary experience protects us
from creating artificial problems which deflect the energy and attention of philosophers from
the real problems that arise out of actual subject-matter. [EN, LW 1:26]

The “Subject-Matter” of Philosophy
Dewey was not the first philosopher to stress the importance of experience to
philosophical study; neither was he first pragmatist to do so. In fact, both Peirce and
James believed experience played a vital role in the application of the pragmatic
method. In “The Development of American Pragmatism,” Dewey attributed the
origin of pragmatism to a passage in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, happened upon
by Peirce, wherein,
Kant established a distinction between pragmatic and practical. The
latter term applies to moral laws which Kant regards as a priori,
whereas the former term applies to the rules of art and technique
which are based on experience and are applicable to experience.9
In a collection of his lectures, published under the title Pragmatism (1907), William
James acknowledged the Kantian roots of pragmatism, but also pointed to the
etymology of the word – one he attributed to ancient Greece – in order to show that
pragmatism “harmonizes with many ancient philosophic tendencies.”10 He hoped to

9

LW 2:3
James, William. “What Pragmatism Means.” from Pragmatism and Other Writings. (New York:
Penguin Classics) 2000. pg. 28 As James put it elsewhere, “There is absolutely nothing new in the
pragmatic method. Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley, and
Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means.” pg. 27
10
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identify philosophical investigation, as such, with the “empiricist attitude” that
“unstiffens” theories and sets inquiry “at work” within the stream of [one’s]
experience.11 He dubbed his position “radical empiricism” and wrote that for those
who would adopt it “the crudity of experience remains an eternal element [of the
world] thereof. There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear
an absolutely single fact.”12 Any analysis of Dewey’s notion of experience must start
from an explication of this position, for it was James’ sentiment that philosophical
debates be reducible to terms about experience that was perhaps the single greatest
influence on Dewey’s thought. James’ position might best be understood as the view
that experience is something that we cannot go beyond, i.e. experience is all we have
and there is nothing real outside of it. And, although James’ view of experience was
now broader in scope than Peirce had originally seen it, it was based on a similar
rejection of the Enlightenment view that saw experience as the locus of interaction
between the objective world and the subjective perceiver – a distinction Dewey also
rejected. As he put it,
What has been completely divided in philosophical discourse into
man and world, inner and outer, self and not-self, subject and
object, individual and social, private and public, etc. are actually
parties in life-transactions. The philosophical ‘problem’ of trying to
get them back together is artificial.13
He believed that experience and the problems that arise out of it are neither merely
the beginning of knowledge, nor a useful tool for linking up mind with world, but
rather, the entire subject-matter of philosophy. He hoped that he could save
11

Ibid. pg. 28
The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 17 vol., 1975
– The Will to Believe, pg. 6
13
LW 16:248
12
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philosophy from itself by removing the various artifices of dualisms and, in this
regard, his work on experience could be seen as a type of “prolegomena” to any
future epistemology. Thus, what Dewey meant by the term “experience” differed
significantly from the way many of his predecessors and contemporaries had used it,
i.e. as the influx of sensory data.
In several of his early essays, Dewey laid the foundation for the more robust
interpretation of experience, exemplified by Experience and Nature (1925) and Art
as Experience (1934), which he hoped would redeem the term by having it “returned
to its idiomatic usages.” 14 But here, idiom is not tantamount to vulgarity or
simplicity. Rather, Dewey sought a return to thinking about experience in less
dissected, philosophically abstract terms. Terms that would avoid many of the
conceptual eddies that had plagued philosophy for centuries. For him, the progress of
philosophy had been stagnated by those eddies, and he hoped to reconstruct it by
reminding us “that philosophy must not be a study of philosophy, but a study, by
means of philosophy, of life-experience and our beliefs about and in this
experience.”15
Dewey’s project was aimed at this goal, and he sought to accomplish it by
showing how experience is inextricably linked with context. By his lights, experience
sets the stage for understanding context, i.e. a proper illustration of experience can
14

cf. LW 1:361-3
John J. Stuhr, “John Dewey.” in Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy: Essential
Readings and Interpretive Essays. Ed. John J. Stuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.) pg.
435
NOTE: “Philosophy,” as it appears in this sentence, refers to three separate human enterprises, each
used by Dewey in a specific sense. The first refers to philosophy in its professional capacity; the
second refers to the philosophical problems of history; and the third refers to the reconstructed
endeavor that Dewey wanted to imbue with experimentalism.

15
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disclose or “lay bare” contextual frameworks. Of course, in order to demonstrate
such a thesis, more clarification of 1) Dewey’s account of experience and 2) what he
meant by the term context are needed. I am confident that once these concepts are
clear, we will see that experience is best understood as the opening up, or
engendering, of contextual transactions. However, first it may be helpful to recount
some of the major movements in Dewey’s thought that led to the development of the
first measure of his naturalism, i.e. the casting of psychological states in terms of the
interaction between organisms and environments.
Developing a Naturalistic Account
Although Dewey’s account of experience could be characterized as a
decisive break from previous outlooks, it did not arise in a vacuum. Throughout his
lengthy career, Dewey came into contact with many different views, such as
Darwinian naturalism, Kantian and Hegelian idealism, German romanticism, and
perhaps most notably British empiricism. He tackled any new idea with enthusiasm,
even in his later years, and was able to glean a great deal from each. But, the last
twenty-five years of Dewey’s life, the period in which he most completely conveyed
his version of pragmatism, hinged upon an empiricism that could be called
“naturalistic” (though Dewey preferred the term instrumentalist) and which moved
beyond any single influence, even beyond James’ radical empiricism. Briefly stated,
Dewey’s naturalism hinges upon the notion that human beings can best be
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understood through their relationships with their surroundings.16 The upshot of this
naturalistic empiricism is the belief that thought and action are two parts of a single
process and that “mind” and “world” name philosophical abstractions rather than
existent entities. As he put it, “The nature of experience is determined by the
essential conditions of life. While man is other than bird and beast, he shares basic
vital functions with them and has to make the same basal adjustments if he is to
continue the process of living.”17 In what follows, I sketch some of the major
developments in Dewey’s thinking towards this position.
As an undergraduate at the University of Vermont, Dewey had been
impressed with Kant’s philosophy. His earliest publication, “The Metaphysical
Assumptions of Materialism”(1882), reflected the Kantian tendency to convert
metaphysical problems to epistemological ones when he criticized materialists for
being logically inconsistent, viz. that “They claim to possess a certain kind of
knowledge, but are unable to explain the derivation of that knowledge on a strictly
materialistic basis.”18 However, Dewey soon came to move beyond this affinity for
epistemologically grounded philosophy as he was introduced to Hegel as a graduate
student at Johns Hopkins University. The time spent on Kant, though, was never
fully forgotten, as became obvious in later writings where Dewey often returned to
the notion of mediated knowledge.

16

Dewey’s brand of naturalism is a precursor to later versions, which argued for describing mental
phenomenon in the terms of natural science, expounded by thinkers such as W.V.O. Quine and
Donald Davidson.
17
AE, LW 10:19
18
Boisvert, Raymond. Dewey’s Metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988. pg. 17

12

The individual who had the greatest impact on Dewey’s thought as a graduate
student at Johns Hopkins, and who helped him beyond Kant, was the neo-Hegelian
scholar G.S. Morris. However, Morris’ brand of Hegelianism was unique in that it
rejected the dialectic of Geist in favor of a more biological description of the
dynamism of nature. In other words, the traditional “subject” in epistemology
became redefined as an organism fully immersed in and interacting with a dynamic,
organic environment – i.e. one that incorporates the organism. This move, which was
vital to Dewey’s later thought, came to Morris from his mentor Trendelenburg, who
had been sharply influenced by Aristotle’s notion of potentiality-actuality and
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Trendelenburg synthesized these two ideas into what
he called “constructive motion” which he saw as the common trait between thought
and being. On one hand, thought moves from potentiality to actuality, per Aristotle,
as it becomes the object that is thought, on the other hand, being moves from
potentiality to actuality, per Darwin, through natural selection. This reading renders
the notion of telos a type of biological end in both nature and organisms.19 Dewey’s
teacher Morris, in turn, appropriated these ideas in his own work as he aimed at
detailing the meaning of existence and the undermining of dualisms. Dewey later
echoed the biologized Hegelianism of Trendelenberg and Morris in Experience and
Nature, with passages such as,
If we consider the form or scheme of the situation in which meaning
and understanding occur, we find an involved simultaneous presence
and cross-reference of immediacy and efficiency, overt actuality and
potentiality, the consummatory and instrumental.20
19

For a more detailed description of Trendelenburg’s “constructive motion” see Boisvert, Raymond.
Dewey’s Metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988. pgs. 22-24
20
EN, LW 1:143
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During these early stages in his career, Dewey’s move from Kant to Hegel can best
be characterized as a shift from epistemology to ontology. The difference is the way
he dealt with the relationship between mind and world, viz. a shift from a dualistic
view to a more holistic one.
In 1903, Dewey published Studies in Logical Theory, which is commonly
taken to be his definitive break from idealism toward experimentalism. However, the
foundations for this volume were worked out gradually over the course of the
preceding years as Dewey became less captivated by Hegelianism. The two largest
contributing factors in Dewey’s empirical turn were his work at Johns Hopkins with
the psychologist G. Stanley Hall, who showed him how scientific analysis could be
applied to the humanities, and his later collaboration with J.H. Tufts at the
University of Michigan. Dewey left Michigan to join Tufts at the University of
Chicago and it was there that he developed a philosophical approach that coalesced
pragmatism with his Darwinian leanings, viz. instrumentalism. Over the following
ten years, Dewey flourished in this environment as he worked out the implications of
combining Peirce’s pragmatism, James’ radical empiricism and Darwinian
naturalism with a scientific approach. Briefly stated, the upshot of combining these
three schools of thought was that while nature was in constant change, human
beings could still act in their environment by testing their beliefs and adjusting them
according to usefulness in experience. In other words, if human beings observe,
through experimentation, what actions are best, then they will form "good laboratory
habits." These habits share a normative feature with Kant's
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universal maxim, i.e. those that can be applied by all inquirers, are best. Moral
imperatives, then, refer to some tried and tested method, not “an ideal drawn from
the blue.”21
Dewey’s work is unique insofar as it took these already established ideas,
assimilated them with others, and built upon them an outlook that, when understood
properly, coalesced the seemingly disparate functions of experience, inquiry, and
learning. In this way, it could be argued, his mature view (exemplified by
Experience and Nature and Art as Experience) aimed at giving insight into what it
means to be human. Two early essays in particular laid the foundation for that more
robust expression of experience.
When the first of these essays, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,”
appeared in 1896, it marked “one of the truly important turning points in the study of
human behavior.”22 There, Dewey attacked the mechanistic view of stimulus and
response that dominated the psychological research of the period. On his view, the
reflex arc concept only mimicked an older, and erroneous, mind-body dualism by
placing stimulus in opposition to response. He wrote,
…we still incline to interpret the latter [i.e. response] from our
preconceived and preformulated ideas of rigid distinctions between
sensations, thoughts and acts. The sensory stimulus is one thing, the
central activity, standing for the idea, is another thing, and the
motor discharge, standing for the act proper, is a third. As a result,
the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a

21

LTI, LW 12:108
cf. EW 5:XVIII [William McKenzie’s introduction the fifth volume of Dewey’s Early Works]
where McKenzie continued with, “It remained for decades one of the most influential works in the
science of psychology and still retains that position among all students not dogmatically committed to
some form, by whatever name, of the same mechanistic view that it attempts to correct.”

22
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patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied
processes.23
In this regard, Dewey complained, the reflex arc was inaccurate because it placed the
parts of an act prior to the whole. It failed to recognize that stimulus, movement, and
response only made sense as an interpretation of an event after it had occurred.
Moreover, he claimed, that the notions of stimulus and response were non-existent
entities that only gain meaning once placed in relation to one another. Simply put,
Dewey argued that the reflex arc was an instance of the empiricist’s fallacy of
placing the parts prior to the whole.
Dewey offered a more naturalistic account, one that viewed stimulus and
response in less mechanistic terms, i.e. as parts of a single process. On such a view,
the reflex arc does not run in a linear direction from stimulus, through response, to
movement. Rather, multiple stimuli, responses, and movements arise simultaneously
and are experienced, in chorus, as a singular, unbroken act, “which is as experienced
no more mere sensation than it is mere motion,” and thus, when analysis dissects the
reflex arc into separate states, “we have, only the serial steps in a co-ordination of
acts.” 24 Simply put, before an act can be divided into parts, its quality as a whole has
to be explicated. But, the reflex arc concept offered no such explanation.
Toward the close of the 19th century, as Dewey began to embrace
pragmatism, he became enamored with James’ radical empiricism and began to
formulate his own version, which, by 1905, he had dubbed “immediate

23
24

EW 5:97
EW 5:106
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empiricism.”25 His essay, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” which appeared
in July of that year, reveals James’ influence on his thinking. Therein, Dewey’s
postulate was aimed at framing all philosophical debate in terms of experience, on
the one hand, and eradicating the notion that experience needs to be grounded in a
transcendent reality or a transcendental truth absolutely free from time and
contingency, on the other. As he put it, “things – anything, everything, in the
ordinary non-technical use of the term “thing” – are what they are experienced as.”26
To illustrate this, Dewey described a situation where a person, sitting in a dark room,
might hear a noise that frightens them. When the lights are turned on and the
harmless source of the noise identified, rather than saying that the noise appeared
frightful and was really harmless, Dewey suggested that we ought to identify the
noise as truly frightful when first heard, and later – because more information is
available to apply to the gross experience – it is truly harmless. Saying the latter
would be more useful than positing, as someone who used the former explanation
would, a distinction between appearances and reality. Dewey wanted to make it clear
that the experienced noise was just what it was experienced as at that time, namely
frightening. On this account, “if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to
tell what it is experienced as being.”27 Compare this with a passage from James’ The
Meaning of Truth (1909):
Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate… that the only
things debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in
terms of experience…. The generalized conclusion is that therefore
25
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the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations
that are themselves parts of experience.28
This passage, on the one hand, illustrates the parallel between these two thinker’s
views. On the other hand, insofar as James had adopted Dewey’s reference to a
postulate, it may suggest the admiration that Dewey felt for James was probably
mutual. In any case, what is clear is that by the release of the “The Postulate of
Immediate Empiricism” Dewey’s thought had come into its own.
Another example that Dewey used in that article was “Zöllner’s illusion” – an
optical illusion displaying lines that appear to be convergent, yet are “truly” parallel.

Opponents of Dewey’s view might use this picture as an example of how describing
something in terms of “experiencing as” does not do justice to the nature of the
experienced object. To this Dewey responds,
That experience is that two lines with certain cross-hatchings are
apprehended as convergent; only by taking that experience as real
and as fully real, is there any basis for or way of going to an
experienced knowledge that the lines are parallel. It is in the
concrete thing as experienced that all the grounds and clues to its
own intellectual or logical rectification are contained.29
The last sentence of this passage reveals that Dewey agreed with James that the
generalized conclusion of this postulate was that “[t]he directly apprehended universe
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needs… no extraneous transempirical connective support.”30 Thus, with the
appearance of the “Postulate” paper Dewey had, once and for all, rejected the
subjective, psychical view of experience and the subsequent division of knowing
from the known that was prevalent in much of his early work. Elements of James’
view could still be found in Dewey’s work twenty years later when he wrote in the
first chapter of his Experience and Nature,
When objects are isolated from the experience through which they
are reached and in which they function, experience itself becomes
reduced to the mere process of experiencing, and experiencing is
therefore treated as if it were also complete in itself.31
Dewey warned against the enterprise of “selective emphasis” – i.e. the tendency to
emphasize the parts of experience that are clearest or most important. When
philosophers are not mindful of this tendency they may end up positing intellectual
abstractions as absolute being. This “conversion of eventual functions into antecedent
existence” is what Dewey called “the philosophic fallacy”.32 In order to avoid
committing this fallacy in regard to experience itself, Dewey sought to map out only
its generic traits. Doing this, he believed would render a coherent account without
spinning off into abstractions.
Mapping Out Experience
For the last half of his life, Dewey aimed at reinstating a more natural,
holistic view of experience that was rooted in the recognition of the
interconnectedness of perceiver and surroundings. He believed this view of
30
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experience and the problems that arose out of avoiding this view were the subject
matter of all philosophical study.
Other [philosophic] methods begin with results of a reflection
that has already torn in two the subject-matter experienced and
the operations and states of experiencing. The problem then is to
get together again what has been sundered – which is as if the
king’s men started with the fragments of the egg and tried to
construct the whole egg out of them.33
By his lights, a vision of experience that emphasized the interconnection of perceiver
and world could answer the original, basic questions of philosophy (questions such
as “Who are we?” “Where do we come from?” “Where are we going?” etc.) without
drawing false distinctions between inner and outer realms. This had been the strategy
adopted by many of the ancient Greek philosophers, and Dewey followed their lead,
especially in his later writings. For it was the logical outcome of a metaphysical
position that, à la Aristotle and many pre-Socratics, placed the concept of “being” in
opposition to that of “becoming,” rather than “nothingness.” By the time Dewey
began composing Experience and Nature, he had fully adopted this line of thought,
as evidenced by his second chapter, “Existence as Precarious and Stable.” On such
an account experience becomes a singular, holistic affair precisely “because the
interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process
of living.”34 However, according to Dewey, questions arose in the course of hundreds
of years of philosophic inquiry because experience can always be turned inward on
itself, it can be analyzed. “[T]he act of observation may be inquired into and form a
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subject of study and become thereby a refined object of study.”35 As he charged, the
result of such introspection, most often identified with Modern philosophy, is the
tendency to draw distinctions, to separate experience into primary and secondary
components, into the “experienced” and the “experiencing.” He rejected this
tendency. As he wrote in 1917,
…it is just the inherited view of experience common to the
empirical school and its opponents [i.e. the rationalist school]
which keeps alive many discussions even of matters that are on
their face quite remote from it, while it is also this view which is
most untenable in the light of existing science and social practice.36
Therefore he argued, contra British empiricism, that primary experience alone (i.e.
the stream of sensory perceptions) is, by itself, ipso facto insufficient for analysis
because of the very capacity for reflection that human beings possess, and, contra
rationalism, that the notion of innate ideas is merely the result of a “bias toward
treating objects selected because of their value in some special context as the
‘real.’”37 As he saw it,
For reflection the eventual is always better or worse than the given.
But since it would also be better if the eventual good were now given,
the philosopher, belonging by status to a leisure class relieved from
the urgent necessity of dealing with conditions, converts the eventual
into some kind of Being, something which is, even if does not exist…
Reflection determining preference for an eventual good has
dialectically wrought a miracle of transubstantiation…38
The traditional subject-matter of philosophy, then, has either been experience (as a
result of philosophical reflection) or attempts to solve the subsequent splintering of
experience at the hands of reflection. More importantly, the problem philosophy
35
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must solve, if it ever hopes to recover its grip on the real world, is how to reunite the
pieces of experience that have been “torn asunder,” viz. perception and reflection.
Dewey tried to reunite these two by mapping out the natural, or “generic,” traits of
experience, which, “taken free of the restrictions imposed by other concepts, is full of
inference. There is, apparently, no conscious experience without inference;
reflection is native and constant.”39 He hoped that these traits would show perception
and reflection to be inseparable. For him, the “immense diversity of human affairs,
interests, concerns, values which compartmentalists pigeonhole under ‘religion’
‘aesthetics’ ‘politics’ ‘economics’ etc., etc.” all share the same character of a
integrated, transactional relationship between human beings and their surroundings.
And, it was this general character that Dewey wanted to capture with his use of the
term ‘experience.’
To compose a complete list of the generic traits of experience that Dewey
proposed would prove difficult. While perhaps the most extensive treatment of these
traits can be found in Experience and Nature, Dewey never offered an exhaustive
account. He would often seemingly create new ones, ad hoc, in order to make a point
in some other line of argumentation. But, this may be explained when considered in
light of the goal Dewey had in mind when introducing these traits, viz. to
demonstrate how experience could be seen as inherently tied to culture. This point is
of vital importance for his overall project, though one which has remained unclear in
secondary literature. On one hand, Dewey’s seemingly egalitarian acceptance of
cultures, even those wildly different from one another, might appear too culturally
39
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relativistic to potential critics. In this regard, his vague presentation of the traits of
experience could be cited as evidence. On the other hand, to attempt a
comprehensive list of such traits would undermine the naturalistic conception of
experience that Dewey hoped to put on the gold standard. After all, if experience is a
natural affair, then it must adapt to changes in the environment, which would amount
to most of its generic traits being wholly contingent. When understood
naturalistically, i.e. as an organism’s method of negotiating it’s way through an
environment, the once limited concept of experience could be tied together with the
broader concept of culture. With this in mind, I will briefly list only those traits that
Dewey emphasized most and were most central to his notion of experience, rather
than attempt to enumerate each of the generic traits that he identified in experience.
Perhaps the two most important traits of experience for Dewey would be
change and continuity. He characterized the first as being “eventful,” “precarious,”
and “hazardous.” I have chosen “change” as a catchall for these descriptions. This
could best be summed up by the doctrine of universal flux attributed to the preSocratic philosopher Heraclitus. However, it is important to note that the mantra
“One cannot step into the same river twice,” so often associated with this doctrine,
only partially represents the Heraclitean view. This version of the statement lends
itself to the interpretation that all things are changing at all times and that even those
things which appear stable are merely in a slower process of flux, one that escapes
observation. But, on such an interpretation, since a river is constantly changing, one
could not even step into the same river once. As recent scholarship has suggested,
what Heraclitus may have meant when he wrote, “On those stepping into rivers
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staying the same other and other waters flow,” (Diels-Kranz B22) was that although
different waters flow through a river, the river itself stays the same. And, more
importantly, it is only by virtue of the flow that there is even a river at all instead of a
pond or lake.40 There is a governing form, in this case that of a river, that bounds the
moments of change and connects them. When understood this way, the doctrine of
universal flux jibes well with Dewey’s notion of change within experience. It is by
virtue of the hazards and uncertainties that color experience, that the live creature has
any experience at all. As Dewey put it,
The doctrine of [Heraclitus], while it held that all things flow like a
river and that change is so continuous that a man cannot step into
the same river even once (since it changes as he steps), nevertheless
also held that there is a fixed order which controls the ebb and flow
of the universal tide.41
This “fixed order” is what led Dewey to posit continuity as a generic trait of
experience. On such a view, experience is not at all atomistic, but rather is “pregnant
with connections,” i.e. experience continuously flows from one part to the next – it is
not simply a succession of events. This continuity, or “stability,” is of vital
importance to experience, without it the moments of change would spill over into
chaos. As Dewey wrote in Art as Experience, “To overpass the limits that are set is
destruction and death… In a world of mere flux, change would not be cumulative; it
would not move toward a close. Stability and rest would have no being.”42 But, this
order is not fixed in the sense of being static; it is dynamic and rhythmic, “fixed” in
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the sense of being directed and connective. Again, Dewey wrote, “All interactions
that effect stability and order in the whirling flux of change are rhythms. There is ebb
and flow, systole and diastole: ordered change. The latter moves within bounds.”43
Elsewhere, Dewey likened the notion of continuity to a variable that remains
constant in a mathematical equation, and as it is in math, he claimed, “so it is in
nature and life.”44
However, it is important to note that the movement “toward a close” to which
Dewey alluded does not signify a move toward some ultimate end. Rather, for
Dewey, it is a move toward an intermediate “end-in-view” which is itself, along with
the means to attain it, still a part of experience. In this way, according to Dewey,
experience is also historical, i.e. it has narrative characteristics which seem to raise
particular events above the otherwise continuous flow of moments. An averted
catastrophe, a meal enjoyed in Paris, a storm passed through on an oversea voyage,
all exemplify the type of event which Dewey called, “an experience.” Such an event
is historical insofar as, “the points of its incidence shift in successive observations of
it… It carries on and is, therefore, instrumental as well as final.”45 Each of these
experiences has a unique quality that defies communication, some attribute that is
wholly immediate and therefore not an object of knowledge. Compare this with the
postulate of immediate empiricism that “things are what they are experienced as” and
it becomes clear that these qualities are not subjective, they belong, as Dewey
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asserted, both to the thing experienced and the one experiencing them. Dewey
claimed that,
In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without
seam and without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same
time there is no sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts. A river, as
distinct from a pond, flows. But its flow gives a definiteness and
interest to its successive portions greater than exist in the
homogenous portions of a pond. In an experience, flow is from
something to something.46
Accordingly, experience consists, writ-large, of innumerably intertwined beginnings
and endings in which these types of affairs may arise. Selective interest allows us to
pick out which moments we will bundle up together out of the continuous flow to
call an experience. When this happens, meaning is imparted to the event and it
becomes communicative insofar as it directs us back to something beyond itself,
namely the background of surrounding moments. Thus, another generic trait of
experience is communication, or expression. The immediacy of the event is unified
and heightened by the stable order of expression. Dewey tells us this is life in its
most robust form.
Experience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened
vitality. Instead of signifying being shut up within one's own private
feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert commerce with
the world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self
and the world of objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender
to caprice and disorder, it affords our sole demonstration of a
stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and developing.47
Dewey refers to these heightened moments as “consummatory experiences.” But, the
ambiguous verb “to consummate” and its noun derivative “consummation” can be
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misleading. On one hand, these can mean closure in the sense of completion or
culmination as in “the consummation of marriage.” On the other hand, the verb can
become an adjective that refers to something that is complete in the sense of needing
no qualification, as in (pejoratively) “the consummate fool,” and it is this latter
meaning, i.e. “without qualification,” that Dewey wished to evoke. A consummatory
experience, on his view, is a grouping of moments that stand out from the rest of
experience, like a great meal, a terrible storm, or a beautiful sculpture. Dewey called
such a grouping “an experience” because it needs no further qualification. It stands
alone as a representative of the rest of the moments surrounding it. These
consummatory experiences serve as exemplars that structure our experience into
manageable components, and since reflecting upon every moment in experience
would prove impossible, we could not reflect upon anything at all without this
ordered structure. That is not to say, however, that once an experience reaches
consummation, that it has come to an end, but rather, as Dewey claimed, “The time
of consummation is also one of beginning anew.”48 Consummatory experiences,
then, are pauses, not breaks, in the continuity of experience. This is how a rhythmic
order is established.
In rhythmic ordering, every close and pause, like the rest in music,
connects as well as delimits and individualizes. A pause in music is
not a blank, but is a rhythmic silence that punctuates what is done
while at the same time it conveys an impulsion forward, instead of
arresting at the point which it defines.49
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But, this rhythmic order is not merely established temporally, “The proportionate
interception of changes establishes an order that is spatially… patterned,” as well.50
If musical rhythm is the temporal analog to consummatory experience, then the
spatial analog might be the rhythm of ocean waves. Each trough delimits each wave
crest, but to say that waves are separated by troughs would belie fluid dynamics. On
the micro level, water molecules are all connected in a processional, circular
movement, on the macro level, troughs flow into waves and call attention to them,
giving significance to each. If we understand this connection and are able to
internalize it, we will operate with our surroundings more harmoniously. As Dewey
put it,
Contrast of lack and fullness, of struggle and achievement, of
adjustment after consummated irregularity, form the drama in
which action, feeling, and meaning are one… Inner harmony is
made only when, by some means, terms are made with the
environment.51
Because these consummatory experiences are dynamic, i.e. they move through
experience with us, they can always be re-evaluated. The consummatory phase,
therefore, is an ongoing process, it has duration and recurrence, and it can rise and
subside in relation to the flow of experience. This feature of experience, that it can be
consummatory, illustrates the formation of context. As Dewey wrote in “Context and
Thought,” an essay that sits in his career roughly halfway between Experience and
Nature and Art as Experience, “Context includes at least those matters which for
brevity I shall call background and selective interest… Background is both temporal
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and spatial.”52 In what follows I will explicate how consummatory experience leads
to the formation of context and what Dewey meant by calling context a
‘background.’
Experience and Context
What is of the greatest importance for Dewey’s account of experience is the
context within which the experience takes place. But, what exactly is context? In
Dewey’s philosophy it is,
…the whole environment of which philosophy must take account in
all its enterprises. A background is implicit in some form and to
some degree in all thinking, although as background it does not
come into explicit purview; that is, it does not form a portion of the
subject matter which is consciously attended to, thought of,
examined, inspected, turned over.53
But, merely calling it a background, offers little in the way of clarification. Dewey
identified three manifestations of the background he referred to as context, each
corresponding to a particular type of interaction within experience.
The first manifestation of context, according to Dewey’s account, arises from
the physical interaction of creatures with environments. The context of this
interaction is the organism itself. As Dewey argued, the context of any experience is
both organic, i.e. it is of and related to an experiencing organism, or “live creature,”
as well as holistic, i.e. its organic aspects should not be separated from non-organic
ones. He wrote,
The organism, self, ego, subject, give it whatever name you choose,
is implicated in all thinking as in all eating, business, or play. Since
52
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it cannot in its entirety be made an explicit object of reflection and
yet since it affects all matters thought of, it is legitimately called a
phase of context.54
But, as we have seen, Dewey rejected the distinction between subject and object, and
his use of terms commonly associated with subjectivity should therefore not be
construed as a moment of hedging. He used these terms in this passage in order to
distinguish between subjectivity understood as a kind of “view from nowhere” and
subjectivity as a “determining attitude” or “interest.” Of the former he claimed, “A
standpoint which is nowhere in particular and from which things are not seen at a
special angle is an absurdity,” and of the latter, “Interest, as the subjective, is after all
equivalent to individuality or uniqueness.”55 The difference, according to Dewey,
arises out of a special characteristic of subjectivity, viz. that although it is involved in
all thinking it can never itself fully be made into an object of thought.56 Subjectivity
in this second sense, i.e. as selective interest, then, is a phase of context. Again,
Dewey warns against letting selective interest run amok in philosophical thought,
Thinking is always thinking, but philosophic thinking is, upon the
whole, at the extreme end of the scale of distance from the active
urgency of concrete situations. It is because of this fact that neglect
of context is the besetting fallacy of philosophical thought.57
But, as we saw above, selective interest is necessary in order to form a
consummatory experience. So if we want to avoid letting selective interest run amok,
it would seem, then, that selective interest is only desirable up to a limit. Dewey
argued that selecting out of specific contexts, such as selecting a particularly good
54
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meal out of the context of a Parisian vacation, only becomes a problem when it is
converted “into abstraction from all context whatsoever.”58 This raises an issue of
inclusion. Dewey implies that it is possible to select out of a particular context and
yet still have that which has been selected be included within some still wider
context. As we have seen, when the appropriate amount of selective interest is
applied to the continuous flow of experiential moments “an experience” is formed.
The ensuing background of that consummatory experience represents the second
manifestation of context, viz. the background of consummatory experiences as such
which arises out of the psychophysical interaction of experience that is known as
reflection.
If selective interest leads both to the formulation of consummatory experience
and to context, then it would seem that experience is, in the very least, intimately
related to context. But, Dewey claimed that in the most general terms, they are not
merely related but are actually identical. As he put it, “If the finally significant
business of philosophy is the disclosure of the context of beliefs, then we cannot
escape the conclusion that experience is the name for the last inclusive context.”59 In
this broad sense, experience and context are synonymous. However, since Dewey
saw experience as a matter of interaction between organisms and environments,
perhaps a better word for context in this regard would be “culture.” And, if we
understand culture as any particular group’s body of knowledge and values, each of
which involves belief, then the “business of philosophy” would be the disclosure of
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culture. Understood in this way, experience bestows meaning on an environment,
meaning that can be transmitted to later generations. Once experience in general has
gained these communicative, contextual qualities it can open up the possibility for
new, less inclusive, contexts. As a result of this communicative interaction within
experience, culture would represent the third and most inclusive manifestation of
context. As Dewey wrote in an unfinished revision to the first chapter of Experience
and Nature,
The name "culture" in its anthropological…sense designates the
vast range of things experienced in an indefinite variety of ways. It
possesses as a name just that body of substantial references which
"experience" as a name has lost.60
And, elsewhere he wrote,
Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would
entitle the book Culture and Nature…because of my growing
realization that the historical obstacles which prevented
understanding of my use of “experience” are, for all practical
purposes, insurmountable. …“culture” designates…that immense
diversity of human affairs.61
Thus, for Dewey, such a view can be summed up in the single word “contextualism”. By making human affairs the primary focus of his empirical
method, Dewey alleviated the need for explaining reality in its absolute form.
Accordingly, subsequent transformations within philosophic inquiry can be viewed
within the context of whatever problems are most pressing. This led Dewey to
formulate a detailed account of inquiry, and it is that concept to which I will now
turn.

60
61

LW 1:363
LW 1:361

32

CHAPTER TWO – INQUIRY: THE ENRICHMENT OF CONTEXT
The search for the pattern of inquiry is, accordingly, not one instituted in the dark. It is
checked and controlled by knowledge of the kinds of inquiry that have and have not worked;
methods which…can be so compared as to yield reasoned or rational conclusions. [LTI, LW
12:108]

The Search for a Pattern
In the preceding chapter, the first measure of Dewey’s naturalism – that
psychological states can be reduced to the interactions of organisms and
environments within life-experience – was shown to be the genesis of what he called
context. Furthermore, it was argued that context, in this naturalistic sense, is
synonymous with a broad conception of culture. However, prima facie, this point is
still lacking in several facets. First, it fails to explain, given that human beings are so
nearly identical in biological terms, why there are a multitude of cultures throughout
the world, often co-existing in the same environment. Second, if experience and
culture are indeed interchangeable, then it remains to be seen how experience could
be characterized in terms of environment manipulation/accommodation – something
implicit in the notion of culture. Third, this account renders context a vague and
amorphous concept, one hardly instructive enough to be called ‘culture’ in anything
but the broadest sense. However, according to Dewey, accounting for how an
organism probes into a particular problem, viz. a ‘pattern of inquiry,’ could assuage
all of these concerns. Since solving problems, on his view, is itself a part of
experience – albeit a specialized part – he first thought to explicate his theory of
33

inquiry by presenting how it showed up within the various functional conditions, or
“modes,” of experience. These modes are, according to Dewey, natural conditions
that determine how organisms deal with the “instability” and “precariousness” of
experience.
In his earliest text concerning inquiry, Studies in Logical Theory (1903),
Dewey set out on this project. There, he raised “important questions about the
relations between dominantly aesthetic, moral and affectional modes and subjectmatters of experience and the cognitional mode and its specific subject-matter.”62
That volume marked the beginning of what Joseph Ratner, in 1939, referred to as
Dewey’s recasting philosophy as a “general logic of experience.”63 Although, in that
volume, Dewey made mention of a number of modes, he never offered a
comprehensive list. Just as was argued in the previous chapter in reference to the
generic traits of experience, this lack should not lead us to call Dewey’s account
patchwork; rather, it should be seen as an initial exploration into a new type of logic,
the broad strokes of which needed to be worked out prior to the details. In fact, the
majority of Dewey’s works between the 1903 Studies volume and his Logic: The
Theory of Inquiry (1938) could each be seen as working out the details of one of the
activities (ethics, art, religion, science, and politics) that arise out of the diverse
modes of experience (the moral, aesthetic, religious, cognitive, and practical) all of
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which, taken together, comprise Dewey’s “general logic of experience.” “When we
take Dewey’s works severally,” as Ratner put it,
they very naturally group themselves into special (or specific) logics
of the typical (or distinctive) modes of experience. Thus to mention
only some of his representative works: Human Nature and Conduct
is the special logic of the socio-ethical mode of experience; Art as
Experience is the special logic of the esthetic mode; A Common
Faith – of the religious; …The Quest for Certainty and Logic: The
Theory of Inquiry – comprise the special logic of the scientific mode
of experience; The Public and It’s Problems, Individualism Old and
New, Liberalism and Social Action – comprise the socio-practical or
utilitarian; …And finally Experience and Nature. [Therein] All
modes of experience are naturally interconnected, being sociocultural differentiations of common experience.64
The insight of this passage deserves to be quoted at length. However, the last remark
of the passage – that the diverse modes of experience are naturally interconnected – is
perhaps the most informative. As Ratner explained, the modes of experience are, for
Dewey, differentiations of a cultural kind, each of which imparts a specialized form
of cultural “intelligence” interwoven into the fabric of common experience.
Although Ratner’s account neatly ties together all of Dewey’s works between
1903 and 1938, we are left wondering many things about the modes of experience.
For instance, if we take seriously the notion that experience flows as a unified whole,
then are the modes merely tributaries of this flow, and if so then how do they arise?
Moreover, are the various modes on par with one another, or does any one in
particular subsume the others? It seems that Dewey may have struggled with these
questions as well. In 1934, Dewey published two major works, Art as Experience and
A Common Faith, each devoted to a particular mode (the aesthetic and religious
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respectively) of experience. But, when read in tandem, these volumes could be
viewed as slightly contradictory, i.e. each seems to laud its particular topic as the
highest mode of experience. That is to say, one feasible conclusion that could be
drawn from Art as Experience is that all experience is aesthetic. Likewise, it could be
argued that one of the underlying themes in A Common Faith is that all experience is
religious. However, these interpretations fail to account for the distinction Dewey
made between general experience and an experience, i.e. those that are
consummatory. A consummatory experience, as Dewey argued, serves as a
representation of the surrounding moments of experience at large. A particular
consummation may be valuable in relation to any one of the modes, it may be
valuable within several, or it may change in time. For example, we may find a
particular work of art important for aesthetic and religious reasons in our first
encounter with it, and then only in some later encounter find some ethical or political
value in it. With such a distinction between experience in general and an experience
in mind, however, it becomes clear that each work is aimed at laying out the various
features of the latter. Interestingly, however, it was only four years after the release of
those two volumes that Dewey completed Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. That volume
contained a marked difference in its treatment of the modes of experience. On one
hand, Dewey clearly had moved beyond discussing the modes of experience in detail,
and, on the other, wherever he did allude to them, they were treated as a mere
outcome of either “common sense” or “scientific” inquiry. The arguments put
forward in Logic were, as he put it,
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…intended to indicate that the different objectives of common
sense and of scientific inquiry demand different subject-matters and
that this difference in subject matters is not incompatible with the
existence of a common pattern in both types.65
Thus, it would seem that by 1938 Dewey had abandoned the project of outlining the
modes of experience, which had been initiated by Studies in Logical Theory. In
response to Ratner, Dewey commented that, “Dr. Ratner has put his finger upon the
main ‘shift’ in my writings.” 66 Later in his response, Dewey responded to Ratner by
highlighting the vital role that solving problems played for the development of his
later work.
… I should, from the start, have systematically distinguished
between knowledge as the outcome of special inquiries
(undertaken because of the presence of problems) and intelligence
as the product and expression of cumulative funding of the
meanings reached in these cases.67
Two points of clarification are called for here. The first is that there is a
salient difference between knowledge and intelligence as “outcome” and “habit” of
the cognitive mode of experience, and those that are the byproducts of non-cognitive
modes. When taken as a product of these latter, non-cognitive modes, knowledge is
strictly passive and intelligence manifests itself as a supplicatory method for dealing
with problems, viz. “tradition” and all of the myths, rites, and superstitions that
constitute it. On the other hand, when knowledge is the result of the cognitive (or
scientific) mode, it is active, and intelligence manifests itself in the form of science
and technology. This seems to answer the question of how different cultures can
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respond to the same environment. Simply put, there are innumerable ways of coping
with precariousness, but only one means for transforming it.
The second point of clarification to be noted is that inquiry, understood in its
broadest sense as the quality that all of the modes of experience share, only provides
us with the type of intelligence that allow for the accommodation or avoidance of
adversity. Although Dewey believed that everyday inquiry is continuous with the
more specialized, cognitive type of inquiry, he argued that only the features
displayed in scientific intelligence can “give expertness of dealing with materials and
tools, and promote the development of the experimental habit of mind.”68 In other
words, only a cognitive mode of experience patterned after science can equip us with
a means of transforming the environment and resolving its perils. This is the second
measure of Dewey’s mature naturalism, and it serves as an answer to the concern that
experience has no inherent feature of responding to environment. Dewey’s account
of this pattern, like that of his conception of experience, developed gradually over the
course of his career. Throughout his work after 1903, Dewey referred to it by several
names, e.g. “the empirical method,” “the new logic,” “experimentalism,” and “the
pragmatic method.” However, toward the end of his career, he returned to the generic
term ‘inquiry’ to encapsulate all of these. By 1938, Dewey admitted in the preface of
Logic that this account “does not have and could not have the finish and
completeness that are theoretically possible.”69 But, he was convinced that it was “so
thoroughly sound” that anyone who entertained it would, “develop a theory of logic

68
69

RP, MW 12:86
LTI, LW 12:5 [emphasis added]

38

that is in thorough accord with all the best authenticated methods of attaining
knowledge.”70 Unfortunately, his account of the modes of experience has, by and
large, remained on the fringes of Deweyan scholarship. But, if we put stock in
Ratner’s account, as Dewey himself seemed to, then we may view Dewey’s Logic
volume as the culmination of a theme that ran throughout the last half of Dewey’s
career, i.e. that inquiry leads to “a judgment of what to do, or what is to be done: a
judgment respecting the future termination of an incomplete and in so far
indeterminate situation.”71
The Indeterminate Situation as Impoverished Context
According to Dewey, everyday life is an activity that requires great skill, “We
talk and read aloud, we get off and on street cars, we dress and undress, and do a
thousand useful acts without thinking of them.”72 As we saw in the previous chapter,
it was in Experience and Nature that Dewey first detailed the precarious features of
experience within a dynamic environment. As he put it,
Man finds himself living in an aleatory world; his existence
involves, to put it baldly, a gamble. The world is a scene of risk; it
is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable. Its dangers are irregular,
inconstant, not to be counted upon as to their times and seasons.73
By the time he penned Art as Experience, nine years and four major works later,
Dewey was willing to put it in more urgent language. “At every moment, the living
creature is exposed to dangers from its surroundings, and at every moment it must
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draw upon something in its surroundings to satisfy its needs.”74 Perhaps it was this
urgency that led him to move away from working out the various sub-logics of the
modes of experience and turn to inquiry in general. Only four years later, Dewey
presented his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in which he offered a concrete definition
of the process of stabilizing the “aleatory world.” As he defined it,
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of
the original situation into a unified whole.75
In order to understand this definition, however, we must first determine just what
Dewey meant by the term ‘indeterminate situation,’ which he referred to as “the
antecedent condition” of inquiry.
Perhaps a good illustration of the indeterminate situation could be found in
the activity of using a computer. As we type on the keyboard and click the mouse,
opening and closing programs, doing what is now known as “multi-tasking,” we give
little or no consideration to the physical interaction with the machine itself, only to
that which appears on the screen. However, when something goes wrong, e.g. the
screen “freezes” or an error message appears, we become acutely aware of those
activities that were, just moments before, hidden in the background of experience.
We are suddenly faced with a situation that irritates us (not just in the sense that we
are left cursing the name of Bill Gates, but also in that the activity of life has
suddenly ground to a halt) and we must employ a measure of thoughtfulness to
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escape.76 This example highlights the contextual features of the indeterminate
situation, which Dewey pointed out early on in his Logic,
What is designated by the word "situation" is not a single object or
event or set of objects and events. For we never experience nor
form judgments about objects and events in isolation, but only in
connection with a contextual whole…an object or event is always
a special part, phase, or aspect, of an environing experienced
world – a situation. 77
The “situation,” then, is a unity of meaningful commerce between an organism and its
environment, a totality of significant relations that stays in the background of
experience; it is, in a word, a context. The organism continues to be taken up with its
surroundings until happenstance interrupts the flow of experience with uncertainty.
“The singular object stands out conspicuously because of its especially focal and
crucial position at a given time in determination of some problem of use or enjoyment
which the total complex environment presents.”78 In other words, immediate objects
within this situation seem to “object” to any sort of physical manipulation, and the
organism no longer finds itself comfortably “situated” within the environment.
The problem, then, is that there is nothing within the context that can be
applied to the situation in order to resolve indeterminacy; it lacks what could be
called the “contextual cues” needed for further action. Simply put, the context lacks
fullness, i.e. it is impoverished. Stating the matter in more personal terms, the
organism is left flailing about, grasping at straws. As mentioned above, there may be
many potential strategies for escaping the imposition of this impoverished context,
76

This example illustrates the striking similarities between Dewey and the early work of Martin
Heidegger. (Cf. Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany, NY:
SUNY Press. 1996. pgs. 72-76, wherein Heidegger discusses the breaking of a hammer.)
77
LTI, LW 12:72 [Dewey’s emphasis]
78
LTI, LW 12:108

41

e.g. supplication, accommodation, or tradition – such are the outcomes of the various
non-cognitive modes – however, each is tantamount to avoidance. But, where these
fail, the organism could be forced to employ what Dewey called “discourse through
use of symbols” in order to escape.79 On his view, interruption opens up a space that
“is not only ‘open’ to inquiry, but it is open in the sense that its constituents do not
hang together.”80 This open space is the indeterminate situation. Dewey claimed that
it was the “open” nature of an indeterminate situation that elicits inquiry to be
“questionable; or in terms of actuality instead of potentiality, to be uncertain,
unsettled, disturbed.”81 It is important to note that, on Dewey’s account, it is the
situation that exhibits these qualities. Indeterminacy is not simply a “personal state of
doubt,” nor is it merely an affair of objects; rather, indeterminacy involves an
interaction. “For Nature is an environment only as it is involved in interaction with an
organism, or self, or whatever name be used.”82 This is important because Dewey
believed that when we move from indeterminate to determinate situations we are not
merely “adapting” to meet the needs of the environment, nor are we “adjusting” the
environment to meet our needs, but rather the result of inquiry is a “transformation”
of both.
The Pattern Of Inquiry
According to Dewey, transformation of the indeterminate situation to
determinate is “active and operational” wherever,
79
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Organic interaction becomes inquiry when existential
consequences are anticipated; when environing conditions are
examined with reference to their potentialities; and when
responsive activities are selected and ordered with reference to
actualization of some of the potentialities, rather than others, in a
final existential situation.83
Granted, that in responding to an indeterminate situation – like our computer
example above – the desired outcome is an absence of irritation, however, the natural
desire for a psychological state of comfort is only the mechanism that helps us stand
up against indeterminacy. It is the employment of intelligence through inquiry that
allows us to actually escape an indeterminate situation.
Dewey first outlined the pattern of inquiry in his Democracy and Education
(1916), where he identified five constitutive steps:
(i) perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that one is
implicated in an incomplete situation whose full character is
not yet determined;
(ii) a conjectural anticipation--a tentative interpretation of the
given elements, attributing to them a tendency to effect
certain consequences;
(iii) a careful survey (examination, inspection, exploration,
analysis) of all attainable consideration which will define and
clarify the problem in hand;
(iv) a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to
make it more precise and more consistent, because squaring
with a wider range of facts;
(v) taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan of
action which is applied to the existing state of affairs: doing
something overtly to bring about the anticipated result, and
thereby testing the hypothesis.84
These could be summed up as doubt, interpretation, survey, elaboration and action.
He believed these steps could occur in sequence or “telescope together” in
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simultaneity, depending on the complexity of the situation.85 But, no matter how they
occurred temporally, all five steps were required for inquiry to take place.
By 1938, however, Dewey had slightly revised these five steps. In his Logic
volume, he outlined six steps, instead of the previous five – each of which can still
easily be fit into the revised list.86 The first of these he identified as the indeterminate
situation itself, which, of course, includes the perplexity and doubt that comprise (i)
in the above list. However, it also conveys the interactional aspects of indeterminacy
that those earlier, more subjective terms lacked.
The second step in Dewey’s revised list was what he called the “institution of
a problem.” Simply put, this refers to the clear statement of a problem and probably
best corresponds to step (iii) in the above list. Dewey claimed, however, that it would
have been proleptic to call the indeterminate situation a “problematic” one since it
only “becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry.”87
Unfortunately in the academic world, as Dewey pointed out, too many “[p]roblems
that are self-set are mere excuses for seeming to do something intellectual.”88
Concerning this tendency, Dewey claimed, “It is a familiar and significant saying
that a problem well put is half-solved.”89 Dewey admitted, however, that clearly
stating a problem would only get the inquirer so far, “the determining of a genuine
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problem is a progressive inquiry…where much prior ingestion and digestion have
occurred”90
This led him to the third step in his 1938 account, viz. the “determination of a
problem solution.” In this vein, Dewey claimed that any situation that is altogether
indeterminate would not lend itself to transformation. In order to get from
indeterminacy to determinacy, then, requires the recognition of those factors in the
situation – or as Dewey put it, “the facts of the case” – that are still determinate. This
amounts to what could be called the formulation of a hypothesis, and includes both
steps (ii) and (iv) from above. Explicating this step led Dewey to define ideas as
“anticipated consequences.”
Dewey simply called the fourth step in his revised account “reasoning.” His
view of reasoning, however, was modeled after the Greek account of “logos,” insofar
as it emphasized both rational and linguistic features. He argued that there was a
double-aspect to experienced objects, since, on one hand, they are just what they are
experienced as, and on the other, they indicate a relation to other objects in fulfilling
some goal.91 This latter is a process of operating with signs, i.e. it is inherently
“logical.” As he put it,
When communication occurs, all natural events are subject to
reconsideration and revision; they are re-adapted to meet the
requirements of conversation, whether it be public discourse or that
preliminary discourse termed thinking. Events turn into objects,
things with a meaning… Events when once they are named lead an
independent and double life.92
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On his view, when a future possibility is seen as an anticipated consequence, “the
conclusion reached is not grounded, even if it happens to be correct. The check upon
immediate acceptance is the examination of the meaning as a meaning.”93 In other
words, the hypothesis that was formulated in the previous step of inquiry, Dewey
argued, must be developed in relation to other conceptual structures. For him, even
the “dumb pang of an ache” can achieve significance, i.e. meaning, when it becomes
representational. This process of transforming events into signs is the consummation
of experience par excellence, and illustrates one of the generic traits of experience,
viz. the communicative.94 When it occurs in the indeterminate situation, a prediction
about the outcome of experimentation can be posited. And, as he put it, not following
this step will be the end of inquiry insofar as the hypothesis “is not developed in
terms of the constellation of meanings to which it belongs,” and such a failure “can
lead only to overt response.”95 This step best corresponds with the first part of (v)
above, i.e. it consists in taking a stand on a projected hypothesis.
Because he believed that events held a “double life (the concrete one of
existence and the abstract one of meaning), Dewey identified the fifth step in the
pattern of inquiry as, “the operational character of facts-meanings.” Prima facie, it
may appear strange to combine two seemingly disparate terms such as “fact” and
“meaning.” However, Dewey believed that, within the process of inquiry, facts are
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always “operational” in that they are selected with respect to a purpose or goal.
Dewey had this to say about facts in their capacity as meanings,
The operative force of facts is apparent when we consider that no
fact in isolation has evidential potency. Facts are evidential and are
tests of an idea in so far as they are capable of being organized
with one another. The organization can be achieved only as they
interact with one another.96
On this view, facts are tied to meaning through the process of inquiry. As Dewey put
it, “Naming them ‘operational’ is but a theoretical recognition of what is involved
when inquiry satisfies the conditions imposed by the necessity for
experimentation.”97 What this amounts to can best be summed up by the second part
of step (v) above, viz. “doing something overtly to bring about the anticipated result,
and thereby testing the hypothesis.” Dewey asserted that when inquiry is successful,
the indeterminate is returned to determinate, but, if it is unsuccessful, then we must
return to the third step, reinterpret the situation with this new information, and
formulate a new hypothesis.
The Determinate Situation as Enriched Context
The sixth and final step in Dewey’s revised list is what he termed “common
sense and scientific inquiry.” This step occurs only when inquiry successfully
satisfies the problem at hand. In reference to this step, Dewey again distinguished
between (common-sense) inquiry that is done within the non-cognitive modes of
experience and the (scientific) inquiry that is done within the cognitive mode. Of the
former, he wrote,
96
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They form a system but the system is practical rather than
intellectual. It is constituted by the traditions, occupations,
techniques, interests, and established institutions of the group.
The meanings that compose it are carried in the common
everyday language of communication between members of the
group. The meanings involved in this common language system
determine what individuals of the group may and may not do in
relation to physical objects and in relations to one another. They
regulate what can be used and enjoyed and how use and
enjoyment shall occur.98
So, the downside to common sense inquiry is that it yields a very narrow set of
solutions, i.e. the traditions and techniques it produces will disclose only a limited
number of possible solutions. Conversely, scientific inquiry, according to Dewey,
frees meaning from the interests of a particular group and allows meaning to become
more abstract where “semantic coherence, as such, is the controlling
consideration.”99 What issues forth is a pattern of reasoning that guides our inquiry
vis-à-vis subsequent indeterminate situations. And, while this may also amount to a
set of norms or imperatives, each is accepted or rejected only in terms of coherence
with one another. This opens up the set of possible solutions to a problem.
The difference between these types of norms and the traditional type could
also be seen as one of form versus content. While common sense inquiry might
provide content that is specific to the immediate needs of a particular group, it lacks a
definite, repeatable structure. Scientific inquiry, on the other hand, provides a
definite structure, or form, that can be used over and over in conjunction with new
contents. What is true of both forms of inquiry, however, is that the last step in each
amounts to the assimilation of a solution back into the original context. In the former
98
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type, i.e. common sense inquiry, the assimilation is in reference to specific,
immediate, environing conditions. It is a temporary solution; it is, in a very real
sense, a “quick fix” to the problem at hand. In scientific inquiry, however,
assimilation occurs on a more general, abstract scale. The solutions garnered from it
may be applicable across an array of indeterminate situations. But, just as the
traditions and customs that are the product of common sense inquiry can limit the set
of possible solutions, so too can the norms of scientific inquiry whenever they are
viewed as foundations. Dewey warned against viewing these abstractions as static,
eternal and immovable entities. As he put it, “Every such interaction [i.e. inquiry] is a
temporal process, not a momentary cross-sectional occurrence.”100 Whereas common
sense inquiry is a process of accommodation by the organism to meet the demands of
the environing conditions, cognitive inquiry is a process of adjustment in the
situation, in terms of both the environment and the organism.101 The result of which
is an increase in complexity for both. Dewey described it as,
The temporal quality of inquiry means, then, something quite other
than that the process of inquiry takes time. It means that the objective
subject-matter of inquiry undergoes temporal modification.”102
Twenty-two years earlier, in Democracy and Education, Dewey had referred to this
temporal modification as “plasticity,” and described it therein as “the capacity to
retain and carry over from prior experience factors which modify subsequent
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activities.”103 In his later work, Dewey would refer to this as the capacity for “habitformation.” As he put it in Experience and Nature,
We find also in all these higher organisms that what is done is
conditioned by consequences of prior activities; we find the fact
of learning or habit-formation. In consequence, an organism acts
with reference to a time-spread, a serial order of events, as a unit,
just as it does in reference to a unified spatial variety. Thus an
environment both extensive and enduring is immediately
implicated in present behavior. Operatively speaking, the remote
and the past are "in" behavior making it what it is.104
Thus, any transformation of the indeterminate into the determinate is a process of
once again returning to a “unified whole,” except that, qua the outcome of cognitive
inquiry, the determinate situation is a context that has been enriched, i.e. it has gained
structure, through the development of a new habit. In the next chapter, this aspect of
Dewey’s thought, i.e. the formation of habits, will be considered in detail.
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CHAPTER THREE – GROWTH: THE OUTCOME OF CONTEXT AND THE
PRAGMATIC METHOD
We do not form habits, ordinarily, because we repeat, but we repeat because we have formed
habits. A habit formed simply by repetition is very likely to be the undesirable sort of habit –
that which is likely to be our master instead of being our servant. [LW 17:299-300]

The Importance of Habit
With the theoretical groundwork of Dewey’s contextualism in place, we may
now turn our attention toward the discussion initiated in the preface of this analysis,
viz. how his notion of context relates to the pragmatic method. Dewey often treated
the reconstruction of habit as synonymous with pragmatic method. In order to
understand why Dewey held habits in such high regard, it will be helpful to trace
some of the more important influences on his unique stance. Reconstructing habit
for Dewey, however, involves the distinction, which was touched upon in the
previous chapter, between habits as the product of cognitive inquiry (i.e. inquiry that
is done within the cognitive mode of experience) and those that are the outcome of
the other, non-cognitive inquiries (i.e. inquiries made from within the moral,
practical, religious, or aesthetic modes of experience.) Establishing such a distinction
will inevitably lead to Dewey’s concept of “growth,” which he considered to be
dependent upon habit reconstruction. Arguably, the idea of growth (as the outcome
of cognitive habit reconstruction) is both the single most important and most
misunderstood strand running throughout Dewey’s philosophical, psychological and
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pedagogical interests, the one that ties these interests together in terms of context.
Unfortunately, many Dewey scholars choose to cast aside his work on growth, and
focus instead on the less amorphous concepts of experience and inquiry.105 The final
aim of this exegesis, therefore, will be to clarify how growth is the outcome of
Dewey’s context.
Just as Dewey’s views of experience and inquiry developed slowly over the
course of several decades of writing, so too did his notion of habit. Throughout his
career, the three concepts evolved symbiotically alongside one another. His first
philosophical treatment of habit appeared in the years just following James’ release
of The Principles of Psychology (1890), which made use of the term to undergird a
type of psychological functionalism, and which Dewey admired for its rejection of
many psychological dualisms. Simply put, functionalism is the theory that mental
processes can be understood only in terms of usefulness. During the nine years after
James’ Principles and leading up to his own “Psychology and Social Practice”
(1899), Dewey wrote about habits in a resolutely behaviorist tone. Viewing habits
through such a lens led him to question traditional notions of self, freedom, and
necessity via James’ functionalist principles.
His 1893 essay, “The Superstition of Necessity,” is an excellent indicator of
this. There he identified the fallacy of the “necessitarian” as conflating what is
“determinate,” in the sense of fully defined, with the cosmological belief in causation
frequently called “determinism.” In this manner, Dewey characterized necessity as a
105
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useful go-between term, i.e. one that was useful in explaining why two seemingly
unrelated concepts were actually related, but “When it has succeeded, its value is
nil.”106 There, Dewey said of necessity,
When we say something or other must be so and so, the “must”
does not indicate anything in the nature of the fact itself, but a trait
in our judgment of that fact; it indicates the degree with which we
have succeeded in making a whole out of the various elements
which have to be taken into account in forming the judgment. More
specifically, it indicates a half-way stage.107
On Dewey’s account, causal necessity is merely the connection we make between
two seemingly unconnected ideas, it is a go-between, the “mid-wife” of judgment
and is only useful insofar as it links up one part of a whole with another part, but
once that link is made it is no longer helpful in our understanding of the whole. Like
Hume before him, Dewey argued that necessity was the name for our habit of getting
carried away by the constitution of a whole by its various parts and thus talking
about the parts as causing the whole rather than merely making it up.108
Dewey claimed that this conflating of whole-part relationships with causal
links can be a hindrance to human inquiry because, “objects as they are for us, as
known, [must] change with the development of our judgments.”109 But, when
necessity is taken to be an essential component of the universe then, as he put it,
“Once the Ptolemaic conception is well rooted, cycles and epicycles, almost without
end, are superadded, rather than reconstruct the original object.”110
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Dewey’s proposal was that we strip the notion of necessity of any ontological
(real world) status that it might enjoy and instead view it as a useful tool in helping
us reconstruct theories whenever new data arise. He believed that it is often easier for
us to form a new theory than to continue to heap exceptions-to-the-rules upon old
ones.111 He believed that if we could adopt this principle of action, then perhaps we
could avoid the stagnations in thought, i.e. stagnations of convention, that have
caused some of the greatest suffering in history. And, it was from within this
Humean line of reasoning that Dewey first considered the “reconstruction” of habit.
In that initial treatment, found in “The Psychology of Effort” (1897), he referred to
reconstruction as a “process” of “adaptation to new conditions” by “bodily states” of
action.112 This accentuates the connotations of “habit” as it is used in its verb form,
meaning “to dwell” or “to reside.” And, Dewey’s interest in “habit” becomes even
more apparent when one considers its etymological connection with terms related to
the notion of environment (terms like “habitat” and “inhabit”) so prevalent in
Dewey’s work.
However, Dewey’s work in education in the latter half of the 1890’s,
particularly his involvement in the “Laboratory School” at the University of Chicago,
led him to develop this position even further before the turn of the century.
Observing the difference that education could make on habituated conduct, Dewey
rejected the one-directional view of habit, i.e. one that posited habit as merely the
outcome of conditioning stimuli, in favor of a more dynamic and socially integrated
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interpretation. This was the view he defended in “Psychology and Social Practice”
(1899), “The School and Society” (1900), and “The Child and the Curriculum”
(1902). In those essays, Dewey decried the prevalent psychological models for their
failure to provide an intelligible account of child psychology. Those models, on his
account, tried to explain the psychological disposition of children in reference to
adult psychological standards. As he put it in “Psychology and Social Practice,”
[The child] is engaged in forming habits rather than in definitely
utilizing those already formed. Consequently he is absorbed in
getting that all-around contact with persons and things, that range
of acquaintance with the physical and ideal factors of life, which
shall afford the background and material for the specialized aims
and pursuits of later life. He is, or should be, busy in the formation
of a flexible variety of habits whose sole immediate criterion is
their relation to full growth.
This suggests that, in a sense, habits can be seen as prior to stimuli, i.e. the
child already possesses the capacity for habits before stimuli that bring that capacity
into fruition ever appear. Habits, on this view, are pulled from the front by biological
and social factors, rather than pushed from behind by factors that were traditionally
explained in the language of physics or theology. In other words, Dewey believed
that human beings were “creatures of habit,” but he saw habits as potentialities that
were antecedent to experience rather than a byproducts of rote action. Habits, for
Dewey, are “pulled from the front” insofar as they are only fixed by their fruitfulness
in attaining future ends, much as genetic mutations in species are only fixed when
they provide some marginal aid in adapting to environmental changes. This
realization jibed well with Dewey’s already heavily Darwinian leanings and was
reinforced by his rejection of the empiricist’s fallacy in his essay on the reflex arc
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concept. He concluded that determinism and psychological functionalism were
incompatible insofar as the latter portrayed habits as a sort of “feedback loop” that
undermined the traditional view of causality on which the former depended by
showing that habits and environment shape one another. For Dewey, this point
further undermined the notion of causality, and he quickly ruled determinism out of
court.113 As Dewey would later write in Experience and Nature,
The reality is the growth-process itself; childhood and adulthood
are phases of a continuity, in which just because it is a history, the
later cannot exist until the earlier exists ("mechanistic
materialism" in germ); and in which the later makes use of the
registered and cumulative outcome of the earlier--or, more
strictly, is its utilization ("spiritualistic teleology" in germ). The
real existence is the history in its entirety, the history as just what
it is. The operations of splitting it up into two parts and then
having to unite them again by appeal to causative power are
equally arbitrary and gratuitous.114
Forming Habits Through Inquiry
By the time he had released Democracy and Education in 1916, Dewey had
fully adopted a biological/social stance on habit formation, i.e. one that emphasized
the feedback loop aspect of habits. There, he referred to the capacity to form habits
as the innate “plasticity” of human beings and laid the groundwork for the distinction
between cognitive and non-cognitive habits that would be the touchstone of his idea
of inquiry. As he explained therein, responding to a problematic situation – like our
113

In The Metaphysical Club, Louis Menand speculated that the death of Dewey’s young son, Morris,
was the main catalyst in his educational interests, since Dewey had written in some of his personal
correspondence with family that he was becoming a student of his son’s growth. In a similar fashion,
one could hypothesize that Dewey’s rejection of determinism, which followed on the heels of Morris’
death in 1895, was another outcome of the loss. Of course, such a claim can only remain purely
conjecture, as Dewey was not prone to writing about himself in an emotionally revealing manner.
What is clear, however, is that for whatever reason, by 1900 Dewey had begun to view habits as a
fundamental part of human character and thus he set out to examine them in detail.
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computer example from the preceding chapter – is brought about by the natural
desire to alleviate indeterminacy. In this regard, Dewey followed Peirce in the belief
that uncertainty was an irritation that human beings were compelled to avoid.
However, Dewey argued that the natural desire for a psychological state of comfort is
merely a mechanism that helps us stand up against indeterminacy. In other words,
instincts, on Dewey’s view, are not foundational; they are merely “elements in
habits.”115 What is needed in order to actually relieve the irritation, then, is a means
of getting back in synchronicity with the environment. The natural way of dealing
with objects that arise in the problematic situation is in terms of value, i.e. they either
have positive or negative value in regard to escaping indeterminacy. For Dewey,
value is a product of inquiry, yet it arises from an inquiry that is made from within a
non-cognitive mode of experience. There is nothing – no fact, object, or entity – that
has intrinsic value antecedent to whatever purpose the situation brings to the table.
The philosopher, carpenter, artist, and environmentalist all view a particular tree in
different ways, but it would be senseless to assert that any one of them sees the tree
“as it is in itself.” The tree is valuable, of course, regardless of whichever view one
takes, but its value is always dependent on a particular end. So, the environmentalist
may value the tree because of its ability to slow erosion, the artist for its symmetry,
the carpenter for the quality of the wood, and the philosopher because of the noise it
might not make when it falls, but each values the tree for the function it fulfills in
attaining some end. Dewey called this type of transaction with one’s surroundings,
“valuation.” Simply put, valuation involves the habit, or capacity, of ranking several
115
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preferences in the order of which will be most beneficial in alleviating the irritation
of indeterminacy. But, this habit is only a proto-process of means-ends manipulation,
it lacks the more complex capacity of dealing with objects as abstract signs, and as
such, Dewey saw it as affective rather than cognitive. 116 While the affective types of
strategy toward indeterminacy may involve minimal cognitive capacity, since it gets
“worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, i.e. in terms
of means,” it still cannot provide knowledge, but only a type of repeatable norm, i.e.
a “value” that can help avoid indeterminacy.117
On Dewey’s view, only the employment of a habit that has been formed by
inquiry from within the cognitive mode of experience – the habit he called
“intelligence” – can allow for an actual transformation of an indeterminate situation.
The habits of valuation alone do not offer the requisite tools for transformation. But,
against the traditional view which treated intelligence as synonymous with the
faculty of reason and, subsequently, as inherent within human beings (a priori is the
technical term), Dewey claimed that intelligence is not prior to experience. He often
referred to intelligence in terms of ‘reasonableness’ rather than as an a priori faculty.
This difference places emphasis on the activity of intelligence. On his account, an
inquirer may do something reasonable, such as choosing to build a boat out of
teakwood planks, or something unreasonable, such as crafting a similar vessel out of
116
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matchsticks. In either case, value has guided action, but only when judged against a
particular end (in this case boat-building) is the reasonableness of an action
demonstrable.
Knowledge, on the traditional view, is either something found in the world or
in the mind. For Dewey, though, knowledge is the outcome of an inquiry wherein the
habits of intelligence transform indeterminate situations into determinate ones. In
other words, all knowledge – even that which has been traditionally termed
“prepositional” – is essentially a skill, one acquired through developing appropriate
habits.
Perhaps Dewey’s most robust expression of habit can be found in his 1922
work, Human Nature and Conduct, a third of which was devoted to the topic. There,
Dewey described habits in the same kind of interactional terms that he would
continue to use in Experience and Nature, Art as Experience, and Logic: The Theory
of Inquiry. To illustrate, he wrote
…habits are like [physiological] functions in many respects, and
especially in requiring the cooperation of organism and
environment… habits are arts… They are working adaptations of
personal capacities with environing forces. 118
This echoes the view laid out in Democracy and Education that habits are social
functions. Yet, in Human Nature, Dewey made strides to describe further the relation
between the social function of habits and inquiry, which he accomplished by
identifying it in terms of meaning rather than value. Talking about “meaning” allows
for consequences of actions to be re-evaluated whenever necessary, whereas talking
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about “value” implies reference to a realm of transcendent essences that Dewey
wished to avoid. As he put it,
[Children] owe to adults the opportunity to express their native
activities in ways which have meaning. Even if by some miracle
original activity could continue without assistance from the
organized skill and art of adults, it would not amount to anything.
It would be mere sound and fury. In short, the meaning of native
activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction
with a mature social medium.119
This shift in emphasis from value to meaning is important for two reasons. First,
because Dewey believed it better conveyed the formation of habits in a noninstinctual light, one that could more readily account for the diversity of cultures
found in various environments. According to him,
Admission that the idea of, say, standing erect [an activity usually
identified as completely instinctual] is dependent upon sensory
materials is, therefore equivalent to recognition that it is
dependent upon the habitual attitudes which govern concrete
sensory materials. The medium of habit filters all the material that
reaches our perception and thought. The filter is not, however,
chemically pure. It is a reagent which adds new qualities and
rearranges what is received. Our ideas truly depend upon
experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon
which they both depend is the operation of habits--originally of
instincts.120
He saw the view that instincts were separable and thus antecedent to habits as yet
another instance of the empiricist’s fallacy. On his view, it would be erroneous to
believe that instincts precede habits simply because such seems to be the case when
an individual is considered in isolation from society. For, he believed that “if an
individual be isolated in this fashion, along with the fact of primacy of instinct we

119
120

HNC, MW 14:65
HNC, MW 14:26

60

find also the fact of death.”121 Diversity, then, comes from the fact that “native stock
has been modified by interaction with different environments,” both natural and
social, not from a difference in native capacities or instincts. Cultural differences can
arise within the same natural environment because habits can be formed from within
any one of the modes of experience, as our tree example above illustrated.122
But, as we have seen from Dewey’s view of experience, the difference among
environments should be couched in temporal as well as spatial terms, since “the
environment in which the act takes place is never twice alike.”123 On Dewey’s
account, the “differences of objective result” that stem from the differences in the
surrounding environment (both living and non-living) “are the only components of
the meaning of the act.”124 As we saw in the previous chapter, Dewey claimed that
the fourth step in cognitive inquiry involved “the examination of meaning as
meaning.”125 This presents the second benefit of shifting from “value” terms to
“meaning” terms when talking about habit formation, i.e. the latter can better capture
the fluidity of the interaction between organisms and environments insofar as
meanings, like consummatory experiences, can always be re-evaluated as they move
through experience with us. Realizing this, Dewey thought, could protect against the
calcification of the means-end distinction. Thus, Dewey referred to all ends as “endsin-view,” because, regardless of what mode of inquiry an organism employs, it can
only respond to indeterminacy by surveying the possible outcomes that are “in view”
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of its particular set of habits. Thus, we see the major difference between habits as the
outcome of cognitive inquiry and those of the non-cognitive variety. The habits
which are employed in the former, which Dewey called intelligence, involve
manipulation of abstract symbols, or meanings, whereas the latter involve the
manipulation of values, which are always more proximate than meanings. In other
words, cognitive habits form the principles of thought, on which logic and
mathematics are based. Non-cognitive habits form the principles of normativity, on
which aesthetics and ehtics are based. The former yield knowledge, the latter –
attitudes.
Habit Reconstruction and Growth
Although both types of inquiry can lead to the formation of habits, only the
cognitive variety can lead to the type of re-evaluation of its habits that Dewey
referred to as “reconstruction.” It achieves this through the versatility of meaning. As
Dewey put it,
The more numerous our habits the wider the field of possible
observation and foretelling. The more flexible they are, the more
refined is perception in its discrimination and the more delicate
the presentation evoked by imagination.126
Because cognitive inquiry employs habits that deal with meaning, this type of
inquiry can lead to the changing of those habits whenever they produce a solution
that does not cohere with other meanings. This is where experimentation, which
Dewey believed was merely a description of the default setting in which all “live
creatures” operated, comes into focus within his account. As he had explained over a
126
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decade earlier, in his How We Think (1910), when any organism is presented with a
series of events it will inevitably relate them to past experiences. Dewey claimed that
the limitation of valuation within non-cognitive modes of experience is that it
“affords no way of discriminating between right and wrong conclusions.”127 Thus,
by itself, it does not provide the habits of deciding between simple conclusions such
as “phlogiston” or “opium’s dormative powers” against more complex explanations
such as “combining oxygen with a combustible” or “a chemical reaction in the
brain.” Cognitive inquiry, on the other hand, has an apparatus for distinguishing
between competing theses. This apparatus is the habit of abstraction, or meaning
manipulation. As Dewey put it, “Experiment is the chief resource in scientific
reasoning because it facilitates the picking out of significant elements in a gross,
vague whole.”128 He thought new interpretations arose through experimentation in
response to particular problems. The difference, in the end, between cognitive
inquiry and non-cognitive valuation boils down to the ability to create new habits via
new interpretations of the meaning of action. Thus, habit reconstruction amounts to
the ability to create new habits through interpretation.
The creation of new habits is, in general terms, what Dewey referred to as
“growth.” In his words,
Habits take the form both of habituation, or a general and
persistent balance of organic activities with the surroundings, and
of active capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions.
The former furnishes the background of growth; the latter
constitute growth.129
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As stated above, this general notion of growth was featured prominently in most of
Dewey’s writings, especially the moral and pedagogic ones. Perhaps a definition, in
this general sense, could be found in Democracy and Education, where Dewey
called growth the “cumulative movement of action toward a later result.”130
This definition, however, is perhaps too vague. With it, Dewey did not mean
to reinstate what he saw as “a false idea of growth or development, – that it is a
movement toward a fixed goal.”131 And with this in mind, he claimed, “Growth is
[mistakenly] regarded as having an end, instead of being an end.”132 On his view,
then, growth “has no end beyond itself.”133 Throughout both Democracy and
Education and Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey laid out many of the conditions
of growth in hope of establishing a more detailed description.
Two of these conditions have already been discussed in this analysis, viz. the
“need for others” and “plasticity.” These are most visibly featured in Democracy and
Education because of Dewey’s belief that “both of these conditions are at their
height in childhood and youth.”134 But, the primary condition of growth, for him,
was “immaturity,” which he claimed includes the notions of capacity and
potentiality. According to Dewey, immaturity, like capacity and like potentiality, is
not properly understood as a negative term.
Capacity may denote mere receptivity, like the capacity of a quart
measure. We may mean by potentiality a merely dormant or
quiescent state--a capacity to become something different under
external influences. But we also mean by capacity an ability, a
130
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power; and by potentiality potency, force. Now when we say that
immaturity means the possibility of growth, we are not referring
to absence of powers which may exist at a later time; we express a
force positively present--the ability to develop.135
The upshot of this view is not only process that growth is a process of “becoming,”
but that it is a process of becoming that ought not reach a point of terminus.
Although growth is the transformation of the indeterminate to the determinate, this
should not suggest once this transformation has taken place that growth has ended.
And, this point is the reason Dewey warned against interpreting consummatory
experience as a break in the continuity of experience. Likewise, achieving a new
power of interaction with the environment through the reconstruction of habit is best
understood as a pause, not a break in the process of growth. This is the point that
Dewey later developed in his 1932 Ethics text, where he wrote,
It is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this
and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself. To make
an end a final goal is but to arrest growth.136
With this statement, Dewey wanted to show that character (his expression for
motives or intentions) and conduct (acts) are inseparable because they are only
different sides of habit formation, and consequently, growth. Therefore, Dewey
argued that the habits produced by cognitive inquiry provide freedom to individuals
insofar as they open up the possibility for new interpretations, whereas habits formed
through repetition, i.e. tradition, restrict freedom and often become our masters by
restricting growth.
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If experience is the formation of context, and inquiry enriches that context,
then growth could be seen as the outcome of context. In this sense, it is noteworthy
that the term ‘edification’ can be substituted for growth taken in the sense of habit
acquisition, without a loss of meaning. It is common to refer to someone who has the
refined habits concomitant with education as “edified,” and the relationship between
this expression and the root it shares with “edifice” should not be overlooked. Those
who have received an expansive education have “built up” their habits of interacting
with their surroundings. Similarly, when a community permits individuals to grow, it
will experience growth as well. Thus, it would seem that Dewey’s work on
experience, inquiry, and growth illustrated the importance of context and offered us a
rich and detailed understanding of culture.
Pragmatic Method and Context
One of Dewey’s most pressing concerns was that philosophy had become yet
another tradition that arrested growth. Although most philosophical schools of
thought employed empirical and critical methods, he saw the method of pragmatism
as the only one that fostered growth through an orientation toward practicality. This
is what led Dewey to devote so much time to the concepts of experience, inquiry, and
growth. When empirical method is oriented in such a way, the active features of
experience are highlighted and interaction becomes the most dependable model,
which consequently blurs the distinction between the creature and its surroundings.
When critical, or reflective, methods are pointed toward real world results, then
inquiry takes on a decidedly experimental tone and the meaningfulness of actions
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becomes easier to account for. And, when these concepts are combined, it becomes
obvious that the notion of self is a byproduct of the habits acquired by the practical
import of these dealings with surroundings. Therefore, on Dewey’s view, the
pragmatic method succeeds where other methods fail because it recognizes the
importance of contexts and, when followed, can lead to a transformation of those
contexts. Simply put, pragmatism makes philosophy relevant again; it gives it the
power to affect its surroundings, whether natural or cultural, and Dewey’s version of
pragmatic method offers a means of improving culture.
First, his work on experience brought out its natural elements of interaction
between organism and environment. We saw that, for him, experience is coterminous
with context, and in a general sense, with culture itself. We also saw that experience
is divisible into several modes, each with its own strategy for coping with the
instability of the environment. Some of those modes, i.e. those which do not involve
reflection, involve a type of coping that relies upon the principle of value. And,
although these modes can provide the organism with helpful habits, the growth that
derives from those habits is a spreading out, not a building up of culture. Context, in
such an instance, is broad – but it has no depth – it is, in a word, superficial. One of
the modes of experience, however, has proven to be successful in transforming
indeterminacy, viz. the cognitive. When inquiry is made within this mode, cognitive
habits are formed that can enrich the context. These habits provide the organism a
chance to grow, and subsequently society and culture will grow as well.
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By emphasizing pragmatic method, which excels in the capacity to identify
and transform context, Dewey provided philosophy a powerful tool in critiquing
culture. One of Dewey’s most oft-quoted passages put it thusly,
Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for
dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a
method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems
of men.137
And, although the intellectual climate in this country has changed dramatically in the
eighty-odd years since Dewey penned those words, they seem just as appropriate
now as they did when he wrote them. I submit that the rest of Dewey’s thought could
be useful in revitalizing American intellectual life, since, on his view, the
responsibility of the philosopher is to be just as concerned with public issues as with
esoteric ones. Social hope, i.e. the hope for a free and peaceful society, is consistent
with Deweyan contextualism and, thus, his might be the position philosophy will
have to adopt if it seeks to ever plunge back into the realm of public affairs.
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